INTERNATIONAL SOCIATRY AND THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

Sociatry has a double role. On one hand it tries to become a science among the social sciences. On the other hand it has the difficult task of watching the behavior of the social sciences, and particularly its own, to see that they do not fall into pathological and illusionistic behavior. Statesmen and diplomats have gone ahead again and formulated a world organization. The section programs of the UNO make such excellent reading that when under their spell we forget that programs similarly eloquent have been formulated in the past. We have seen already social scientists rising from their chairs, not unlike the way it was after the end of the first world war, adding to the politico-legalistic their own utopias—international language, international justice, international education, international university, international police and so forth. Physical and social scientists are equally inclined to follow blindly the baton of the piedpipers and advocates of the "One World" system. It is at this point that sociatry has the task to examine critically the behavior of social scientists. They do not differ in procedure from religionists—whom they consider otherwise so thoroughly antiquated. Religionists too have often been inclined to think in terms of universal brotherhoods, considering the real people lightly as temporary obstacles and sinners, as if the Kingdom of God would be just around the corner. The social scientists, not only that they fall easily into the popular myth of the one world, have themselves developed another idea in recent years, that of the "lag of the social sciences, marching far behind technology." This has a basis in fact, but it implies the myth that if the social sciences would be sufficiently advanced, having better instruments, methods and knowledge of social structure, it would then be easy to attain the aims which humanitarian projects and the UNO have set. This proposition is dangerous because it deviates our attention from the truly crucial dilemma which we are facing. Even if the social sciences would be advanced far beyond any dream we have of their future, we would be just as poor and unable to make progress as we are now.

The greatest difficulty in our actual mastery of the social universe is not in the lack of invention of instruments by which these ends can be attained, but in Man himself. He is inept and inert, his spontaneity is in an embryonic stage of development. It is therefore not the lag of the social sciences as compared with the physical sciences which bars progress; the lag is rather in Man's limitations and unreadiness for using instruments and

methods which already exist in order to master his biological, social and cultural challenges. In the social sphere, even today, he lives in a world of comparative "plenty". The number of methods and instruments which social science has developed are rotting in libraries and small experimental communities. Whereas on the technological plane Man's readiness to make use of instruments as soon as they are invented is great, on the social plane the readiness is extremely low, practically nil. It is easy for Man to use a stick, a gun or an atomic bomb, but extremely difficult for him to adapt himself to the use of social instruments which would assure his freedom within his own society. The answer to this difficulty is not easily given. Man needs to be educated, but education means here more than mere intellectual emancipation, it isn't a matter of a deficiency of Man's intelligence only. It is also more than a matter of emotional enlightenment, it is not a matter of insight only. It is rather a matter of the deficiency of his spontaneity to use the available intelligence and to mobilize his enlightened emotions. But such a program of preparedness requires in addition to factual information, the training of Man's spontaneity, the training and retraining of men on a worldwide scale. It requires action research and action methods continuously modified and sharpened to meet new inner and outer environments.

There are, therefore, three propositions which we have to weigh: 1) the myth of the one world; 2) the myth of the insufficiency of the social sciences to deal with the present emergency in human society; 3) the myth of a research panacea. We have considered the first two, and are proceeding to evaluate the third. Social scientists, when challenged with the need of doing something about the world situation usually respond with a statement of despair: What we need is more research, more research here, more research there. Each has his own private list of reseach projects—study of national characters and customs—of moral and immoral standards—of similarities and differences—of attitudes and prejudices—of official and unofficial ideologies—of white and black propaganda—of psycho-social networks as to the dissemination of ideas, feelings and attitudes through them, etc.—which should be undertaken, and which are of first, second or third importance before anything constructive can be done. They appear to be so correct in their judgments that the challengers usually retreat in silence. We, however, are interested in the result: what is usually observed is that the social scientists do nothing except perhaps write a paper in which the position of futility is explained in scientific terms.

It cannot be denied that many of our own friends are among the scientific

town criers. The sociatric status of a scientist is not changed by the quality of his phraseology, whether he talks of "attitude and opinion research", "morale and propaganda research", or "action and operational research", "sociometric and psychodramatic research". What matters is whether they share the same behavior in regard to a) carrying their hypotheses to actual test and b) particularly in regard to a situation which requires some decisive, personal action.

There is a need for a behavioral imperative for scientists—it might also be called a "sociatric code". It is generally recognized that certain social phenomena operate in most social groups, small or large, as for instance attractions and repulsions, ethnic attitudes and prejudices, national character and custom, official and unofficial ideologies, etc. The first behavioral rule to which all scientists should agree is: If a scientist enters a situation as member of a group, he should act in accord with the sociatric code; behaving like a scientist means to apply scientific instruments with which he is acquainted to the immediate situation at hand; *action in situ is the thing.* Action in prospect may be premature, action in retrospect may be too late. It is obvious that when joining a committee consisting of a few, the members may be of different sex, of different religious, ethnic and cultural background, and provide an urgent occasion to apply to them sociometric or any group method which might help towards a substantial improvement of the relations among the members. The first step which one makes when entering an unexplored social area is to treat it. Every next step has to be taken up again and treated in turn, and so forth ad infinitum. The social units which are formed by scientists themselves in behalf of societal goals should be sociometrically and sociatrically sound and *thus lay a brick towards the sociometric foundation of the United Nations Organization.*

One bitter lesson we should have learned from the twenty years of sociometry behind us, that it is fruitless to plunge ahead of the dynamics of the small groups to which we belong to the next larger group. The fire which we have left raging behind us will reach us and stop our march forward.

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